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In enumerating the prohibitions that characterize the unique kedusha of the kohein, the Torah adds a commandment that appears somewhat superfluous: "Uf'as z'kanam Lo YiGaleichu" - they shall not cut the corner of their beards (21:5). If the prohibition of "giluach"[1] applies to all Jews, why does the Torah reiterate it specifically with the prohibitions that are exclusive to the kohanim? The Gemara (Yevamos 5a) derives from this aberrant placement that while the giluach of a non-kohein violates a single lav, the giluach of a kohein transgresses both a lav and an asseh. Thus, a kohein who shaves his beard in an inappropriate manner violates two commandments, while a non- kohein who performs the same act violates a single commandment.
Having established the unique nature of a kohein's prohibition of giluach, the Gemara subsequently attempts to prove that a single mitzvas asseh can override a combination of an asseh and a lav, from the case of a kohein who is a metzorah. As part of the prescribed purification procedure detailed in Parshas Metzorah, a metzorah must shave his beard and peyos,an action prohibited under normal circumstances by the prohibition of giluach. If, as the Gemara just established, a kohein's giluach constitutes both an asseh and a lav, and there is only a single asseh for a metzorah to purify himself, apparently the single asseh of his purification can override both the lav and asseh of giluach of a kohein. This case would thus seem to violate the common Talmudic dictum, "ain asseh docheh lo sa'aseh v'asseh" - a single positive commandment cannot override a negative and positive commandment in tandem.
The Gemara ultimately dismisses this proof, however, noting that the limited application of the prohibition of giluach (Rashi: women are not included in the prohibition) classifies it as that which is aino shaveh b'kol. As such, this prohibition is unsuitable to serve as a paradigm for other, more universal commandments that apply to all Jews (shaveh b'kol). Thus, although the case of a kohein metzora appears to suggest that a single asseh can override a combination of both a lav and an asseh, the uniqueness of this particular case renders it unfit to establish a general principle for all commandments.
Noting the Gemara's dismissal of the kohein metzora as a potential model, Tosafos (ibid. s.v. "V'acati") ask a basic question. Granted that the case of the giluach of the kohein metzora cannot serve as a model for other cases of asseh docheh lo sa'aseh v'asseh (because giluach is aino shaveh b'kol); but the Gemara should at least derive that an asseh is docheh a lo sa'aseh v'asseh she'aino shaveh b'kol? That is, we should infer from the kohein metzora that a single positive commandment can deflect a negative and positive commandment in tandem, provided that we are dealing with a combination of a negative and positive commandment that is not applicable to everyone, like giluach?
Tosafos point out that the assumption of such a rule, however, would conflict with a later statement of the Gemara. In Yevamos 20a, the Gemara explores the case of a kohein gadol who must perform yibum on his deceased brother's wife. If the deceased brother had already performed nissuin[2], this situation presents a serious problem. After all, a kohein gadol is prohibited by a lav from marrying a widow, and he is further enjoined by an asseh to marry a besulah. The Gemara notes that although yibum is a positive commandment which can override a single negative commandment (esseh docheh lo sa'aseh), it cannot override both a positive and a negative commandment ( ain esseh dochel lo sa'aseh v'asseh). What emerges from this Gemara, Tosafos point out, is that the Gemara is indeed willing to apply the restriction of ain esseh dochel lo sa'aseh v'asseh even when dealing with a prohibition which is "aino shaveh b'kol." Our Gemara's conclusion thus appears to contradict the conclusion of the Gemara on 20a.
Tosafos resolve the apparent contradiction by refining our understanding of the injunction against a kohein gadol marrying a widow. Tosafos suggest that the asseh and lav of the kohein gadol are actually considered to be "shaveh b'kol" - universally applicable. Even though these commandments specifically address the kohein gadol, they also apply to his wife. Thus, if a kohein gadol marries a widow, both he and his wife violate the prohibition of the forbidden union. Since the kohein gadol's wife is not a kohein gadol, yet is still subject to the injunction, Tosafos adduce that the lav and asseh of a kohein gadol not marrying a widow can indeed apply to anyone, and are thus considered " shaveh b'kol." Thus, the conclusion of Yevamos 5a that an asseh can indeed be docheh a lo sa'aseh v'asseh she'ain shaveh b'kol stands, and the case of a kohein gadol performing yibum on a widow presents no challenge to this rule, as such a case involves a lo sa'aseh v'aseh which are actually shavin b'kol.
The Ran (Sanhedrin 18a) proposes a different solution to the apparent contradiction. Unlike Tosafos, the Ran assumes that the inability of a kohein to marry a widow is indeed considered to be "aino shaveh b'kol," and that this combination of a positive and negative commandment is indeed overridden by the positive commandment of yibum, which is shaveh b'kol. The Gemara's reason for forbidding this yibum is simply a rabbinic enactment. In theory, however, the yibum could certainly override the prohibitions.
In formulating his opinion, the Ran assumes that the mitzvah of yibum itself is considered to be that which is "shaveh b'kol" - applying both to men and women. This assumption, however, is not unanimously accepted. The Chinuch (598), for example, assumes that the Mitzvah applies solely to males. Presumably Tosafos (Gittin 41a s.v. "Lisah") agree with the Ran's opinion, that both men and women are obligated in yibum[3].
Tosafos and the Ran's debate on this issue stemmed from the apparent superfluity of the Torah's commandment against Kohanim performing giluach, a sin that is prohibited even to non-kohanim. Interestingly, Parshas Emor's haftarah presents a similarly redundant commandment as well. In this week's haftarah, the navi Yechezkel states (44:31) : " kol n'veilah u'treifa min ha'of u'min ha'b'heima lo yochlu hakohanim" - that the kohanim shall not eat any neveila or tereifa from fowl or animals. Like the prohibition of giluach, this commandment appears somewhat superfluous. After all, if every Jew is enjoined to refrain from non-kosher meat, why are the kohanim singled out?
The apparent superfluities of our parsha and our haftara suggest that the unique kedusha of the kohein is not restricted solely to exclusive mitzvos of the kehuna. Rather, the kohein's kedusha expresses itself in every aspect of his life, even in mitzvos that are not specifically addressed to the kohanim. The pervasiveness of his kedusha affects even shared mitzvos, such as giluach and kashrus, elevating them to a qualitatively different level. Rather than being compartmentalized or confined to specific areas of halacha, the kohein's kedusha is holistic, encompassing every dimension of his life in an equal fashion. At the levaya of Rav Moshe Feinstein, zt"l Rav Nissan Alpert zt"l pointed out that one of the pesulim of a kohein described in our parsha is a " Saruah" (21:18), which Rashi defines as one whose limbs are uneven. Rav Alpert suggested that this pesul represents the need for an even distribution of kedusha throughout all aspects of a kohein's life. Just as one arm may not be longer than the other, so too one dimension of a kohein's life may not be holier than another.
The lesson of the holistic kedusha of the kohein holds true not merely for kohanim themselves, but for all Bnei Torah as well. As members of Klal Yisrael, we are required to maintain the highest standards of sanctity in all areas of our lives. Kedusha and high ethical conduct are not confined to the walls of the Beis Medrash or the Shul, but must rather evenly pervade our entire existence, in each and every endeavor that we undertake.
[1] "Giluach" refers to the shaving of a specific type of facial hair with a specific type of razor. See Makkos 21a.
[2]"Widow," for purposes of this article, refers specifically to a widow who has already undergone Nissuin. As to the halacha of a Kohein Gadol who must perform yibum on a widow who has only undergone "Erusin," see Gemarah there.
[3] See there, where Tosafos suggest that dechiyas issurim can only occur when both parties (i.e. man and woman) are obligated in the asseh.